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In a repeat trade model with buyer's speci¯c investment, a simple
renegotiable contract implements an e±cient outcome if premature ter-
mination of trade is governed by an appropriate contract breakup rule.
In equilibrium, such a rule allows for termination with positive prob-
ability and gives the buyer a bargaining leverage over the seller when
the contract is renegotiated ex-post. These returns ("breakup rents")
from buyer's rent-seeking complement his ex-post bargaining power and
restore his ex-ante investment incentives when he would otherwise under-
invest due to a standard (ex-ante) hold-up problem. Buyer's opportunism
thus creates social value and restores e±ciency in case of frictionless rene-
gotiation. When the contract is rigid and not renegotiable until after the
¯rst round of trade, however, a ¯rst-best breakup rule does not exist. A
second-best rule trades o® buyer's investment and seller's activity dis-
tortions that arise from excessive e®ort to curb the buyer's bargaining
leverage. Conditions on existence of a ¯rst or second-best breakup rule
as well as implications for the legal discussion on compliance standards
for breach of contract are given.
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Suppose that Hart and Moore's (1990) chef and skipper still carry on their \gourmet seafare"
service, and the chef has assumed ownership of the yacht. Their business is thriving, as over the
years the chef has established a reputation of serving the best clam chowder in the region. Each
year he presents an even ner recipe, developed during a harsh and long winter, and each year
he approaches the local shermen to bargain over a contract that ensures him steady, weekly
supply of clams throughout the season. Whether or not a clam \harvest" is of high or low
quality depends on a number of factors, and shermen as well as the chef will not learn their
exact realization and the quality level until the rst day of clam season. They understand that
writing a complete contract, accounting for all these factors, is not viable, but rather renegotiate
their agreement upon observation of the season's quality type.
The chef and the shermen engage in repeat trade and enter a contract that is renegotiable
after the state of the world is realized. From the standard hold-up literature1 we know that if
the chef (the buyer) does not have exclusive property rights and full bargaining power at the
renegotiation stage, he will not be able to capture the full returns of his investment (note the
assumption of non-transferability of his recipe) and will thus invest less than is ecient (possibly
the level that otherwise earns him a Gault Millau toque). To bypass this ineciency, vertical
integration has been suggested as solution in the context of one-time interaction (Grossman
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Recall, however, that the chef already owns the yacht
(following that advise); what is he supposed to do with yet another cutter?
In this paper, I propose a contractual solution to the hold-up problem arising from buyer's
lack of complete property rights as a possible alternative to vertical integration. I argue that
by allowing for breakup of a repeat transaction contract, the buyer gains an ex-post bargaining
leverage over the seller via hold-up when renegotiating the contract. He will exploit these
rent-seeking opportunities and extract an additional bargaining surplus|\breakup rents"|to
increase his returns on investment and restore his ex-ante investment incentives. The buyer's
opportunism, in many other contexts associated with inecient outcomes, therefore creates
social value and improves the eciency property of the underlying repeat trade model.
I consider an incomplete contracts framework where the state of nature and the buyer's
specic investment level are nonveriable by a third party. Attention is limited to simple
contracts, that means parties are assumed to enter agreements that specify for each trade period
the delivery of a good of constant quality in exchange for a constant price.2 These contracts
are assumed to be public action contracts (e.g. Watson, 2007) in the sense that parties rely on
1For legal reference, see Corbin (1963; 1A, p. 105); for early work in economics see Goldberg (1976), Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian (1978), or Williamson (1985). Comprehensive reviews can be found in reviews by Schmitz
(2001), Bolton and Dewatripont (2005; ch. 12), Fares (2006), or Shavell (2007). See also Anderhub, K onigstein,
and K ubler (2003) for experimental evidence.
2Contracts are as simple as specifying x weekly deliveries of y pounds of clams for price of z dollars per pound.
The integer `x' is assumed to be strictly larger than 1 and smaller than the number of deliveries in long-term
supply contracts as analyzed by Joskow (1985, 1987, 1990), Masten and Crocker (1985), Goldberg and Erickson
(1987), Crocker and Masten (1991), or Goldberg (2002).
2a third party \public" enforcer to compel damages in case one of the contract parties does not
comply with the terms of trade.3 For these damage measures, I assume default breach remedies
as stipulated for instance in U.S. contract law by the Uniform Commercial Code (American
Law Institute, 2000).4 In particular, referring to Cooter and Eisenberg (1985) or Spier and
Whinston (1995), I apply ecient expectation damages, i.e. monetary transfers that put an
aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other party had fully conformed to the contract
given the ecient level of specic investment.
The key element of this setup is the contract termination or breakup rule.5 Watson and
Wignall (2007) argue that the literature on public action contracts imposes articial constraints,
in particular adhoc restrictions on the physical acceptance of deliveries. In the setup under
investigation here, I assume a broad duty to mitigate damages (cf. Edlin, 1996), which implies
that a buyer has to accept goods once they are delivered, yet can claim ecient expectation
damages if the good is not conforming to the terms of trade. I do, however, allow for anticipatory
rejection of all goods delivered in future trade rounds. The breakup rule serves as an \articial
legal barrier to cancellation penalties" in the sense of Grossman and Hart (1986; p. 695) who
rule out such barriers in their analysis. The shape of such a barrier is with respect to whether
or not termination of the contract is rightful and is as such conditional on the conformity of the
goods already delivered. Hence, if the seller tenders a quality that is below a certain breakup
threshold, the buyer may rightfully terminate but is in breach of contract otherwise. This
conditional breakup rule is related to the contract cancellation rule for installment contracts
under the Uniform Commercial Code. It stipulates that a buyer may cancel6 a contract if the
defect of a delivered good substantially impairs the buyer's (subjective) valuation of the entire
contract. I will comment on this specic rule in relation to the results of this paper's model in
a later section.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic framework of a
repeat trade technology with two periods. In Section 3, I establish the institutional framework;
I rst comment on the repeat transaction contract, then dene the applied damage remedies for
breach of contract, and nally introduce the renegotiation routines. In Section 4, the parties
equilibrium strategies for the semi-renegotiated contract are established. Section 5 holds the
main results of the paper. I rst show that for the setting with contract rigidity (the contract
3The eciency properties of simple contracts have been explicitly looked at by Huberman and Kahn (1988),
MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), or Schmitz (2002).
4There exists a substantive literature that analyzes the properties of breach remedies with respect to allocative
eciency, investment incentives and risk-sharing. See for instance Shavell (1980), Rogerson (1984), Spier and
Whinston (1995), Edlin (1996), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Che and Chung (1999), Che and Hausch (1999),
or Schweizer (2006) among others.
5Comino, Nicol o, and Tedeschi (2006) and Muehlheusser (2007) explicitly account for (contract) termination
clauses in their settings. Furthermore, the partnership-dissolution literature (cf., e.g., Cramton, Gibbons, and
Klemperer, 1987; Moldovanu, 2002; Li and Wolfstetter, 2007) is somewhat related.
6A word on terminology: In this paper I refer to \putting an end to a contract but retaining any remedies for
breach of contract" as contract termination. The Uniform Commercial Code refers to these facts as cancellation.
Termination in the Uniform Commercial Code means that \all obligations which are still executory on both sides
are discharged [i.e. no damages for nondelivered future installments upon breakup can be recovered] but any
rights based on prior breach or performance survives (x2-106)."
3is \sticky" and cannot be renegotiated until after the rst trade round), a linear breakup rule
cannot implement a rst-best outcome. For the case of full renegotiation (no such stickiness)
a rst-best best outcome is indeed possible. I brie
y comment on the existence of such an
eciency restoring breakup rule and then discuss some implications for the legal literature on
compliance standards. Section 6 concludes. The proofs of the presented results are given in the
Appendix.
2 Setup
The basic setup is as follows: Let a seller \S" (she) produce and deliver an indivisible commodity
of nonnegative quality q1 at date 1 and of quality q2 at date 2, ~ q = (q1;q2). The goods
are referred to by their time of deliveries and indexed by i = 1;2. The costs of production
(subsuming the costs of delivery) of qi are given by a convex, twice-dierentiable cost function
c(qi;). Technological restrictions prevent advanced production of q2 at date 1. Upon the start
of production of q1, the seller observes her productivity type  that prevails over the lifetime of
the business relationship. A higher productivity denotes lower production costs, c (qi;) < 0,
in particular, lower marginal costs, cqi (qi;) < for all qi and . Type  is randomly drawn
from the unit interval  with pdf f () and a strictly increasing cdf F (). It is observable to
the buyer and seller yet nonveriable by third parties. The seller does not incur any xed costs,
hence c(0;) = 0 for all . Moreover, the Inada conditions are satised for cost function c(qi;)
with respect to qi.
The buyer \B" (he) can increase his marginal valuation of qi by investing r  0 at convex cost
z (r). Such investment may be in the business's physical or human capital and is relationship-
specic with zero value outside the respective buyer-seller match. Let the buyer's valuation
of qi for both i = 1;2 be denoted by a concave, twice-dierentiable valuation function v (r;qi)
that satises the Inada conditions for both arguments. The buyer's valuation is nonnegative
for any qi and r. A higher level of investment r implies a higher valuation for any given qi,
i.e. vr (r;qi) > 0 and vrr (r;qi)  0, where v (0;qi) > 0 for any positive qi. Moreover, r has a
positive eect on the marginal valuation of qi, vqir (r;qi) > 0. Also note that I assume perfect
relationship-specicity, that means investment is without value if performance does not occur,
implying v (r;0) = vr (r;0) = 0. Moreover, the buyer can decide not to trade commodity 2 with
the seller but instead prematurely terminate the business relationship and exit the game. Let
this decision  2 fE;Cg be equal to E if the buyer exits and no good is exchanged in t = 2, or
C if he decides to continue.
Both parties are assumed to be risk neutral expected utility maximizers and do not face
any wealth constraints. The surplus from trade of commodity i with quality qi is the dierence
between buyer's valuation v (r;qi) and the seller's costs of production c(qi;) and denoted by
w(r;qi;) = v (r;qi)   c(qi;). The overall surplus from repeat transactions (net of investment
costs z (r)) is simply the sum of w over i, given  = C, hence W (r;;~ q;) = w(r;q1;) +
1(=C)w(r;q2;). Moreover, let the social surplus be these gains of trade W minus the costs
4of investment z (r) and denoted by c W (r;;~ q;). From the above assumptions it follows that
c W (r;;~ q;) is concave in qi and r; moreover, let it be nonconvex in type .
The sequence of decisions in this basic framework is the following: The buyer invests r
before the productivity type  is realized. The seller then observes state (r;) and chooses
quality levels qi for i = 1;2 where q2 is conditional on buyer's decision . Since termination
implies a loss of second period gains of trade,  = E is Pareto-inferior to continuation  = C
for all positive productivity types  > 0. The rst-best investment and activity levels are such
that the social surplus c W (r;;~ q;) is maximized. Let the optimal activity level for i = 1;2 as
best response to buyer's investment be a function of  and r denoted by





   = C

(1)





of w, the quality function o (r;) is time-invariant. Similarly, the optimal level of investment
is a best response to the quality strategy and maximizes the expected social surplus such that
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f ()d: (2)
The rst-best levels are then  () = o (;) and  = o (~  ()). The rst-best benchmark
is dened as follows:
Denition 1 (First-best benchmark). The rst-best benchmark outcome f~ ;~  ()g is such
that parties trade in the second period,  = C, and the ex-ante ecient investment level  and
the ex-post ecient activity vector ~  () are mutual best responses and characterized by the
rst-order conditions
@c W (~ ;~ q;)
@qi











! = 0: (4)
The assumptions for v (r;qi) and c(qi;) ensure that there exists a unique  () > 0 for any
 > 0. Recalling that the seller does not incur any xed costs of production, for any positive
productivity type  there is always a positive value of qi such that w(r;qi;) > 0. Hence, trade
is always ecient. Moreover, by the properties of v (r;qi) and z (r) the rst-best investment
level is positive,  > 0.
3 Institutional framework
The underlying bilateral trade model is complemented by (3.1) an incomplete contracts frame-
work. I assume enforceability of contracts and (3.2) apply damage function specications for
5noncompliance that are proposed by economic and legal scholarship. Moreover, (3.3) contracts
are assumed to be renegotiable.
3.1 Repeat transaction contracts
Before the buyer invests and the seller sequentially produces and delivers goods i = 1;2, the
parties can enter an incomplete, simple supply contract that denes the heart of the trade
relationship. Enforceability of such a contract before a court of law is restricted to terms that
are veriable, i.e. are observable to third parties, or can be proven without reasonable doubt
or at less then prohibitively high cost. As is standard in the law and economics literature, the
seller's productivity type  and the buyer's investment level r are taken to be nonveriable, while
quality and price levels as well as the parties' communication are observable to third parties
and therefore contractible. Similarly, contract clauses that condition on state (r;) are assumed
to be not enforceable and contracts incomplete. The class of contracts under consideration is
simple with regard to the unconditionality of quality and price provisions: A supply contract
species a constant quality level  q 2 Q to be delivered in exchange for a price  p 2 R, where  q
and  p are xed both within and between trade periods.
Denition 2 (Repeat transaction contract). Let Q = f q :  (); < 1g and i = 1;2. A repeat
transaction contract Z species  q 2 Q as quality of good i to be delivered in t = i in exchange
for a price  p 2 R.
The choice set Q represents the interval

0;qmax
where qmax =  (1). Note that a contract
Z is not the only contract structure governing repeat trade. An even simpler one than repeat
transaction contract Z is given by a sequence of one-shot long-term contracts; or parties may
renounce the possibilities of foresighted (long-term) contracting and engage in spot-market
trading. Both alternatives, however, give rise to a hold-up problem as the buyer's investment
is assumed to be relationship-specic and in renegotiations the seller can extract part of the
buyer's quasi-surplus. A repeat transaction contract on the other hand binds the seller to his
promise of delivery in both periods. The buyer's protection from hold-up is thus relatively more
pronounced given contract Z than under these alternative contract structures. Such \contract
bundles", however, are considered to be not irrevocable. I introduce an explicit linear contract
breakup rule that allows for termination of the trade relationship conditional on the veriable
history of the contract. In particular, it is taken to be conditional on the quality q1 of the
seller's rst delivery and grants the buyer the right to terminate the trade relationship and exit
the contract if and only if q1 <  q where  is between 0 and 1.
Denition 3 (Breakup rule). Let  2 [0;1]. The buyer may prematurely terminate the trade
relationship and recover damages for q1 and nondelivery in t = 2 if and only if q1 <  q.
Under investigation in this paper is the question of whether or not an appropriate (default)
breakup rule  can substitute for more sophisticated contracts and implement a rst-best out-
come. That means, not object of interest is the set of all classes of contracts that can implement
6a rst-best outcome under the given multiple trading periods model; sophisticated contracts as
analyzed for instance in MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) are not considered in this framework.
I assume simple terms of trade such that quality  q is unconditional (e.g. in \one-size-ts-all"
standardized contract) on the the nonveriable state (r;) and the overall payments 2 p such that
the expected joint surplus b  is equally shared between the buyer and seller7 and the per-unit
price  p equally apportioned across deliveries.
3.2 Damages for noncompliance
Contract Z binds the parties to trade in periods 1 and 2 and denes their obligations as follows:
The buyer has a claim over delivery of goods i = 1;2 of predetermined quality  q in periods 1
and 2, while the contract grants the seller the right to deliver and see her delivery accepted
and paid for by the buyer. Unless these rights are forfeited by action or deliberately waived by
proper communication, failure to comply with the respective contractual obligations results in
\breach" of contract. In that case, the contractual performance claims (delivery and acceptance)
are replaced by claims for monetary compensation compelled by a court of law.8
Suppose the seller wrongfully delivers a good with quality qi <  q, then the buyer can claim
monetary compensation that puts him in as good a position as if the seller had fully conformed
to her obligations. The seller is thus liable for any losses the buyer incurs from a defect in
commodity i. In particular, the buyer can recover his ecient expectation damages (Cooter
and Eisenberg, 1985; Spier and Whinston, 1995) that restrict compensation to his damages for
any qi under an ecient investment level . These damages are denoted by d(qi;  q) and dened
as
d(qi;  q) = max

v (;  q)   v (;qi);0
	
: (5)
The maximum operator hereby induces a no-windfall-gains assumptions; the seller may not
recover from the buyer any compensation for a supraconforming quality qi >  q.9 Applying
ecient expectation damages introduces a \compensation bias" for inecient investment levels.
To see this, note that the buyer's compensated payos as function of his investment level and
the delivered quality qi are given as  b(r;qi) = v (r;qi)  p+d(qi;  q); his true expectation interest,
given the actual level of investment, is equal to v (r;  q)    p. It is straightforward to check (and
summarized in Lemma 1) that the buyer is overcompensated for a defective quality level qi <  q
if r < . This is due to the value-enhancing nature of the buyer's investment, vqir (r;qi) > 0,
that induces damages d(qi;  q) under ecient investment  to be higher than under the actual
level r < . The reverse case holds true for r > . Lemma 1 provides a useful characterization
of the the degree of over- and undercompensation as function of the buyer's investment decision.
7This pricing rule corresponds to a non-cooperative bargaining solution with zero outside options (see, e.g.,
Rubinstein, 1982; Sutton, 1986) or a cooperative, symmetric Nash-bargaining solution with zero disagreement
points (Nash, 1950).
8Under codied U.S. contract law, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) x1-305(a) gives the general notion
of \expectation damages", the specics are found in Sections x2-7XX.
9Neither does she have to pay damages for the delivery of a nonconforming qi >  q.
7Lemma 1 (Compensation bias). Suppose the seller delivers a good i with defective quality
qi <  q. Let h(r;qi) = v (;qi)   v (r;qi). Ecient expectation damages in equation (5) yield a
compensation bias h(r;  q) h(r;qi). This term is positive (\overcompensation") for r <  and
negative (\undercompensation") for r > .
In general, expectation damages induce ecient activity incentives for the seller. She fully
internalizes the buyer's losses for a nonconforming qi and performs eciently.10 With nonveri-
ability of investment r and the propagation of ecient expectation damages, the alignment of
seller's incentives ceases to hold. A negative compensation bias, implying buyer's undercompen-
sation, results in less-than-full internalization, a positive bias induces the seller to internalize
losses the buyer does in fact not incur. The following restriction on the value-enhancing eect
of r will prove to be useful. It states that, given  q, the valuation eect of r =  relative to r = 0
must be strictly smaller than the expected per-period trade surplus given ecient investment.
Note that the buyer's overcompensation is maximized for r = i = 0 such that h(0;  q) h(0;0),
where h(0;0) = 0. Let i be the seller's choice of qi, given . The restriction on vr (r;qi) thus
reads as follows:
Assumption 1. h(0;  q) <
R
 w(;i;)f ()d.
By equation (5), the buyer is able to recover any losses associated with the seller's defective
performance. Moreover, the breakup rule in Denition 3 implies that for a delivered quality
below the threshold  q, the seller in total breach of contract and forfeits her right to deliver
in t = 2 and see her delivery accepted and paid for. Hence, the buyer may not only collect
damages as in equation (5) for a nonconforming quality q1, but he is granted the right to
breakup and recover the losses associated with no delivery, q2 = 0, in t = 0. These are denoted
by  b(;  q) = v (;  q)    p. If, however, q1   q, then breaking up the trade relationship
constitutes breach of contract on the buyer's side. In that case, he is liable for the seller's
expected payos  se
2. Recall that the seller's true payos are deterministic as  has already been
realized, yet due to nonveriability, damages may not condition on her type. For tractability it
is assumed that buyer's payos, given ecient investment, and the seller's expected payos in
t = 2 under Z are nonnegative.
Assumption 2.  b(;  q)  0 and  se
i  0 for i = 1;2.
Legal enforcement of contract Z is through the remedy regime characterized by ecient
expectation damages in equation (5) and the conditional breakup rule in Denition 3. It is
dened as damage function D : R2
+  fE;Cg ! R that maps parties' veriable actions qi and
10For a discussion of the ecient breach paradigm see for instance Hermalin, Katz, and Craswell (2007;
ch. 5.2.1).
8Figure 1: Timing of the model with contract rigidity
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f q;  pg Parties enter contract Z.
r Buyer invests at cost z (r).
 2  Seller's productivity type is realized.
q1; d(q1;  q) Seller delivers good 1 in exchange for
price  p; damages for defective delivery.
f qR (r;);  pRg Stage-2-renegotiation: If agreement is
not reached, trade is under terms of Z.
q2; d(q2;) Seller delivers good 2.
 into monetary 
ows from the buyer to the seller,
D(~ q;) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
P2
i=1 d(qi;  q) if  = C
d(q1;  q) + b(;  q) if  = E and q1 <  q
d(q1;  q)    se
2 if  = E and q1   q:
(6)
The regime gives rise to the parties' legal claims which they are assumed to able to collect at
the end of the game. Note that the exact timing of the transfers is irrelevant for this paper's
analysis.
3.3 Renegotiation
Parties engage in renegotiation of contract Z after state (r;) has been realized in order to
adapt to the new contract environment and trade on the Pareto-frontier account for and gen-
erate possible eciency gains. Watson (2007) shows in a single-transaction contract framework
that the specics of the renegotiation technology, in particular timing, matter for the model's
implications. Similar to his approach, I consider two dierent degrees of contract renegotiabil-
ity: In a rst step I assume that the contract is \sticky", implying that the specications of
the rst round of trade cannot be changed. The timing of this scenario is depicted in Figure 1.
Drawing upon the implications from this semi-renegotiated contract, I then consider a fully

exible contract where both rst and second quality levels can be adjusted upon observation of
(r;); see Figure 2 for the respective timeline. I brie
y discuss the underlying timing and bar-
gaining structure for each of the renegotiation technologies before proceeding to the equilibrium
analysis.
93.3.1 Contract rigidity
For the rst scenario under contract rigidity, I take the initial contract Z to be inalienable at
stage t = 1 and allow for renegotiation only after the closing of the rst round of trade. A source
for such a renegotiation restriction may be an assumption of asymmetric type observability.
This means that the seller observes her type in stage t = 0 while the buyer observes  in
t = 1. Alternatively, one may assume that both parties simultaneously observe , yet not until
the initialization of the production process of good 1, not allowing for halt of production and
renegotiation of specications until after stage 1.
The timing, depicted in Figure 1, is as follows: After Z is entered, the buyer invests and
type  is realized. The seller then decides over the quality of the rst delivery. After this rst
exchange, the parties may renegotiate quality  q and price  p for the second good and agree on
contract ZR. Since the model is one of perfect information, it is straightforward that parties
choose a quality level q such that the surplus from trade in t = 2 is maximized,  qR 2 QR  R+,
and bargain over their respective shares (re
ected by price  pR) of the trade surplus  (r;). If
renegotiations shall fail, the parties honor contract Z (or do not trade if the buyer has decided
to terminate) for trade of i = 2. After the parties have collected their legal claims determined
by the remedy regime D(~ q;) the game ends.
For the stage-2 bargaining game under contract rigidity I assume take-it-or-leave-it oers
by the buyer with probability  or by the seller with probability 1   . If the seller (buyer)
accepts (`A') the buyer's (seller's) oer, the parties trade a good of quality q2 in exchange for
the agreed price; if q2 fails to conform to  qR (r;), then compensation for the buyer is given
by equation (5). Note that the negotiation game is asymmetric as to the parties' legal claims.
By contract Z, the seller is given the right to deliver the second period good but forfeits this
right by delivering a good with suciently low quality. Moreover, the breakup rule grants the
buyer the right to exit the repeat transaction contract conditional on the seller's rst delivery.
I assume that by rejecting (`R') the seller's oer, the buyer does not waive this right. This
implies that in case of a rejected take-it-or-leave-it oer, the buyer can choose between exiting
`E' or continuing `C' the contract. His valuation of each of these options is determined by the
conformity of this breakup. If q1 <  q, then the seller's total breach of contract (`T') renders
buyer's exit \rightful", in which case he is able to recover damages for nondelivery, q2 = 0. If,
on the other hand, the seller's rst period delivery is such that q1   q, then the seller is not
in breach of the whole contract (`N') and buyer's termination is said to be \wrongful." In that
case, the buyer is not complying with his contractual obligations and thus in breach of contract
on his part. Since termination implies an end of the trade relationship with no trade surplus
realized, parties' second period payos add up to zero. If the buyer chooses continuation of the
contract upon rejection of the buyer's or seller's bargaining oer, then trade in period t = 2 is
according to contract Z. The bargaining game is summarized as follows.
Stage-2-renegotiation. Given q1, the buyer (seller) makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer with prob-
ability  (probability 1   ). The seller (buyer) can accept `A' or reject `R' this oer. If it is
10accepted, the game ends and trade is according to ZR. If the seller (buyer) rejects, then the
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 1    buyer (seller)
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E C E C C E C E buyer
Once the buyer has chosen to exit the contract (either rightfully or wrongfully), the contract
is terminated and respective damage claims exchanged at the end of the game. The buyer's
payments in case of wrongful termination derive from the seller's contractual right to deliver. We
can abstract from the seller's continuation outside option for q1   q since it is fully captured by
the buyer's liability in case of wrongful termination. The asymmetry that arises from assigning
the exit option exclusively to the buyer is related to the bargaining setup in MacLeod and
Malcomson (1993) or Shaked (1994).
3.3.2 Frictionless renegotiation
A frictionless renegotiation technology implies that the terms of trade in Z for both i = 1;2
can be changed and adapted to the state (r;) realized in stage t = 0. Before the seller enters
production of good 1, the parties meet to agree on  qR (r;) and a transfer  pR that re
ects
their relative bargaining positions. As in the case under contract rigidity, I assume probabilistic
take-it-or-leave-it oers for the bargaining routine. If no agreement is reached, then trade in the
rst round is under the terms of contract Z. After the delivery of good 1 parties may re-enter
renegotiations under the stage-2-renegotiation routine. Note that by Denition 3, the breakup
rule is conditional on the quality of the rst delivery; exit `E' is therefore not an option in
stage-1-renegotiations.
Stage-1-renegotiation. After state (r;) is realized, the buyer (seller) makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oer with probability  (probability 1   ). The seller (buyer) can accept `A' or reject
`R' this oer. If it is accepted, stage-1 is according to ZR; it it is rejected, the parties trade






 1    buyer (seller)
R A R A seller (buyer)
114 Equilibrium strategies
Before discussing the implications of the possibility of contract termination on the eciency
of investment and trade, I rst derive the contract parties' equilibrium strategies given some
arbitrary breakup rule . Due to its conditionality on q1,  only enters the stage-2-renegotiation
game. For this reason, I will rst analyze the setup under contract rigidity and then proceed
to the case without frictions. The insights from the semi-renegotiated contract will help under-
stand the underlying dynamics, and the results for full-renegotiation case are straightforward
implications. The subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are solved for by backward induction.
4.1 Stage-2-renegotiation
If stage-2-renegotiations fail and the buyer opts for `C', then trade takes place as specied in
Z. In that case, the seller maximizes her second period payos  p   c(q2;)   d(q2;  q) over
quality q2. By equation (5) it is straightforward to see that it cannot be an optimal strategy
to deliver a quality level above and beyond the level specied in the contract. This is because
for any q2 >  q, damages are equal to zero, yet costs of production are increasing in q2. A
supraconforming q2 >  q is therefore strictly dominated by q2 =  q for any state (r;). By
rearranging the seller's payos, the second period quality can be written as
2 2 argmax
q2 q
w(;q2;)   b(;  q) (7)
and is equal to 2 = minf ();  qg. This is by Denition 1 a rst-best quality level for
all  such that  ()   q. I will refer to such a rst-best quality up to full conformity as
constrained rst best denoted by   () = minf ();  qg. Expectation damages make the seller
the residual claimant since the buyer's absolute share of the trade surplus|his compensated
payos b(;  q)|is taken to be xed, inducing optimal activity incentives for the seller. Damages
in equation (5), however, are such that the seller delivers as if the buyer has invested eciently
and r = . For this reason, quality levels are ineciently high for the true r <  and
ineciently low for r > . While second period quality is independent of r, the period surplus
from trade under contract Z is increasing in the level of investment and denoted by
  (r;) = w(r;   ();) (8)
If, for state (r;), stage-2-renegotiations succeed, then parties will have agreed on a quality
level  qR (r;) that maximizes the second period gains of trade,
 qR (r;) 2 argmax
q2
w(r;q2;): (9)
The revised contract ZR is simple in the sense of Denition 2 and species a xed quality
 qR =  qR (r;) to be delivered in exchange for a xed price  pR. Note that while parties contract
12Figure 2: Timing of the model with unrestricted renegotiation
t = 0
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f q;  pg Parties enter contract Z.
r Buyer invests at cost z (r).
 2  Seller's productivity type is realized.
f qR (r;);  pRg Stage-1-renegotiation: If agreement is
not reached, trade is under terms of Z.
q1; d(q1;) Seller delivers good 1.
f qR (r;);  pRg Stage-2-renegotiation of ZR (if stage-1
succeeded) or Z (if stage-1 failed)
q2; d(q2;) Seller delivers good 2.
under perfect information and agree on a Pareto-optimal quality level, the seller's actual quality
decision may not be ecient. By equation (5), the seller may in fact deviate from contract
provision  qR (r;) and again deliver as if the buyer had eciently invested. To see this, notice
that the delivered second period quality is such that the seller's second period payos  pR  
c(q2;)   d(q2;  qR) are maximized, hence
R 2 arg max
q2 qR(r;)
w(;q2;)   bR (10)
where  bR is a constant. In case of buyer's underinvestment r < , the no-windfall-gains
assumption implicit in equation (5), inducing the upper bound for R, is a binding constraint.
Given , the quality from seller's unconstrained optimization is equal to  () > o (r;),
which is, however, strictly dominated by a fully conforming  qR (r;) = o (r;). The surplus





 r  
= w(r;o (r;);): (11)
If on other hand, the buyer's investment exceeds the ecient level, then the reverse logic applies,
the no-windfall-gains assumption is not binding and R =  () <  qR (r;) for all types . This





 r > 
= w(r; ();): (12)
Here, the negative compensation bias from Lemma 1 serves as a binding constraint, inducing
a suboptimal trade surplus w(r; ();) < w(r;o (r;);). As is shown in Lemma 2, rene-
13gotiation of Z is always in the mutual interest of both contract parties as there are never joint
losses incurred from renegotiation.
Lemma 2 (Renegotiation surplus). The renegotiation surplus g (r;) =  (r;)     (r;) is
nonnegative for all levels of investment r and productivity types .
Trade under the renegotiated contract ZR is never Pareto-inferior to trade under the initial
agreement Z. As a matter of fact, renegotiation yields a Pareto-improvement for all but a
single value of . This implies by the assumed information symmetry that renegotiation failure
cannot be on the equilibrium path (although parties may agree on ZR = Z). The contract's
quality specication is given in equation (10), price  pR for the good delivered is determined by
the stage-2-renegotiation bargaining routine presented in the previous section. Lemma 3 shows
that this game yields an asymmetric Nash-bargaining solution, where the parties' legal claims
from options `C' and `E' are the disagreement points and the buyer's oer probability  his
bargaining share of the renegotiation surplus. Note that if the buyer can credibly exercise his
(o-equilibrium) exit threat `E', then the second period gains of trade are equal to zero and the
renegotiation surplus simply g (r;) =  (r;). The resulting payos ~ b(r;q1;) and ~ s(r;q1;)
for the buyer and the seller, respectively, are referred to as continuation values of the contract.
Lemma 3 (Continuation values). The continuation values ~ b(r;q1;) for the buyer and ~ s(r;q1;)
for the seller as result of an asymmetric Nash-bargaining solution are equal to

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 b(;  q) +  (r;);
  b(;  q) + (1   ) (r;)
!
if q1 <  q and r  
 
 b(r;2) + g (r;);
  (;)   b(;  q) + (1   )g (r;)
!
if otherwise.
As can be seen from the case dierentiation, both parties can in
uence their second period
payos by choosing appropriate levels of investment r and quality q1. For the buyer, the
investment level determines whether or not the exit threat `E' is indeed credible. Lemma 3
establishes this credibility result and shows that if the buyer overinvests such that r > ,
then the continuation values are independent of breakup rule  and quality q1. This is a
straightforward implication of the renegotiation setup: Recall that if one of the two parties
rejects a bargaining oer, it is never optimal for the buyer to exit the contract since by Lemma 1
the call option `C' yields strictly larger payos than `E'. This is by the negative compensation
bias h(r;2) < 0 for r >  and the buyer's payos under contract Z strictly larger than the
compensation for breakup,  b(r;2) =  b(;  q)   h(r;2) >  b(;  q). If, on the other hand,
investment falls short of the ecient level, then the compensation bias is positive and  b(r;2) <
 b(;  q). Hence, exit `E' is the buyer's best response to a rejection of his own (the seller's)
renegotiation oer xS (xB).
Anticipating this, the seller can \choose" the renegotiation game (i.e. her outside option)
to be played by presenting a suciently high quality q1. Assumption 2 ensures that if the seller












q1 <  q
q1   q
q1 <  q
q1   q
Buyer Seller Renegotiation stage
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;  q) + 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) (r;)
!
9
> > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > ;
   b(r;2) + 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delivers a good of quality q1   q, the buyer's only credible option is to continue `C' and call
for trade under contract Z. If, however, q1 <  q, then the buyer's exit threat is indeed credible
and his dominant outside option choice is `E.'
The continuation values are characterized by r, q1, and . Moreover, the seller's equilibrium
strategy for the subgame(s) starting at t = 2 is perfectly anticipated. Since the model is one of
symmetric information, the game can be reduced to a two-stage sequential move game: First,
after contract Z is entered the buyer invests in r. Then at the second stage, after observing
, the seller delivers quality q1 after which the reduced extensive form game ends. Both r and
q1 trigger renegotiation and continuation values as given in Lemma 3. Figure 3 depicts the
structure of this continuation game.
4.2 First-period quality
Comparative static results for the continuation values with respect to q1 are presented in Corol-
lary 1. It can be seen that these continuation values exhibit a discontinuity at the breakup
threshold  q. Given some parameter restrictions, the seller benets from a quality level that is
suciently high to not yield an exit threat to the buyer.
Corollary 1. For a 2 fb;sg let  (~ a)  ~ a
 
r;q1;
















 0 for all  and r; \>" if r <  and for all  > 0 if r = .
By inducing the discontinuity of second period payos, the buyer's threat gives rise to an
ex-post hold-up problem since the seller's strategic stage-1 \choice" of buyer's stage-2 outside
option deviates from the optimal quality level. The seller will be inclined to exert excessive costs
in order to prevent buyer's hold-up in stage-2-renegotiations. To see this, note that as valuation
15and cost functions are additively separable, the optimal quality level is equal to o (r;). If
the seller's optimization problem is time-separable, then, analogously to 2 in equation (7), she
will deliver a good 1 of quality q1 =   (). For r >  the optimal level will be strictly larger
than the rst-best, for r <  it will be lower than the constrained rst-best for all  such that
o (r;) and higher for all  such that o (r;) >  q. Note, however, that by Corollary 1 the
seller's rst period optimization problem
1 2 argmax
q1 q
w(;q1;)   b(;  q) + ~ s(r;q1;) (13)





, renders the seller's second period payos a function of the rst period quality level.
Her rst period decision thus re
ects her \choice" of the renegotiation game to be played. A
suciently high q1 will deprive the buyer of his exit threat and in return improve the seller's





and the buyer's exit threat is indeed credible, then there exists a subset e    of productivity
types  for which a deviation from the constrained rst-best strategy is dominant. Instead of
delivering a good of quality 1 =  () <  q, these sellers will strategically overshoot and incur
additional production costs to be able to deliver a good of quality 1 =  q and thus prevent
the buyer from exercising his exit threat. As a result, for r <  the delivered quality level
will be even larger and thus more suboptimal, whereas for r >  quality level 1 is unchanged
since exit option `E' is not a credible option. This asymmetry with respect to r follows from
the negative compensation bias for overinvestment.
The incentive to overshoot holds for types  2 e  such that the additional costs of excessive





second period. The productivity type ~  is the lowest for which this holds true. This implies that
all types below this threshold will deliver a good of quality 1 <  q, all types equal or above
deliver 1   q. The proof of Lemma 4 in the Appendix formally develops these conditions.
Lemma 4 (Quality). The seller's subgame perfect equilibrium strategy 1 will be constrained








> 0, then for a nonatomic subset of types  it holds
that 1 =  q >  (), hence quality level q1 is ineciently high with strictly positive probability.
Given , the seller's rst period strategy for the subgame with r >  is equal to a constrained
rst best,   () = minf ();  qg. For the case with a credible exit threat, r  , the delivered
quality of good 1 is denoted by




 () if  < ~  or  2
 ;  

 q if  2
~ ;  
 q if    ,
(14)
where the threshold of ecient breach   such that    

=  q and   such that    
=  q. The
hold-up problem stems from the eciency losses associated with seller's excessive performance
16in e  =
~ ;  
and is a straightforward implication of the breakup rule. Allowing the buyer to
exit a repeat transaction contract gives him a bargaining leverage in ex-post renegotiations. The
buyer holds up the seller and extracts a factor  of the second period gains of trade  (r;) by
threatening the termination of the contract and legal enforcement of damages for total breach
of contract. The less restricted the breakup rule, i.e. the higher , the more pronounced the
distortion of the seller's performance incentives and the stronger the hold-up eect will be, as
is established in Corollary 2.




> 0, the probability of an excessive quality level 1 =  q >  () is
increasing in  and decreasing in r.
By fully restricting the buyer's exit option, i.e. by a breakup rule such that  = 0, the
seller will never be inclined to deliver an excessively high quality level in period t = 1. Hence,
the higher the buyer's rent-seeking opportunities, the more diluted the seller's performance
incentives will be.
4.3 Specic investment
A full restriction of the buyer's exit option restores the seller's incentives to deliver goods of
(constrained) ecient quality. Such an extreme breakup rule, however, may dilute the buyer's
ex-ante incentives to invest. In order to reconcile the model's implication with the literature
on breakup restrictions, I rst brie
y comment on the case where the seller rather than the
buyer engages in (selsh) specic investment. For this purpose, suppose for a moment that
r and ~ q do not exhibit any complementary eects. While in such a case a positive breakup
parameter  gives the buyer ex-post a bargaining leverage over the seller, it does harm him
ex-ante as he is not able to credibly commit not to threaten cancellation when a q1 <  q is
delivered. The main implications of Lemma 4 and Corollary 2 are thus in line with the existing
law and economics literature on the restriction of contract breakup. Goldberg and Erickson
(1987) among others, for instance, argue that harsh quality requirements and legal regulation
that allows for \working to the rules" may give the buyer rent-seeking opportunities through
an inecient bargaining leverage over the seller. This will in return lead give rise to a hold-up
problem and induce underinvestment by the seller. Williamson (1985; pp. 43{63), for instance,
argues that due to asset specicity in transactions, continuity of contracts is of signicant value,
and protection from opportunism is desirable. Moreover, Crawford (1990) concludes that in
settings of repeat trade with seller's relationship-specic investment, one-period contracts lead
to inecient underinvestment. Indeed, parties will then optimally choose to enter long-term
contracts since single transaction deals based on repeated bargaining are \unattractive" due to
hold-up and parties' rent-seeking. For the context under investigation here, this implies that
restricting the buyer's right to prematurely exit the contract protects the seller's investment
incentives (in addition to the eects in Lemma 4). The following Proposition|straightforward
from Lemma 4 and the standard hold-up results of Crawford (1990) among others|summarizes
these insights.
17Proposition 1. Suppose the seller invests in r0 at cost z (r0) such that cr0 (r0;qi;) < 0 and
cqir0 (r0;qi;) < 0. Then a breakup rule such that  = 0 is optimal.
Proposition 1 re
ects the main arguments brought forward in favor of a restriction of termi-
nation rights for the case when the victim of termination, i.e. the seller, is the investing party.
In order to induce undiluted investment incentives, future period payos need to be protected
from buyer's rent-seeking by restricting contract breakup. This result changes substantively,
however, if it is instead assumed that the investing party is the buyer as the beneciary of
termination. To grasp the intuition, rst consider two aspects with regard buyer's investment
incentives that have been extensively discussed in the context of single transaction contracts
(cf. Edlin, 1996) and whose implications carry over to repeat transaction contracts. First, an
expectation damage remedy, when based on the realized investment level, may induce incentives
that lead to overinvestment (see, e.g. Shavell, 1980; Rogerson, 1984). This will indeed be the
case if expectation damages serve as a full insurance remedy that give the buyer the full value of
investment with certainty, i.e. even when trade does not occur. Referring to Fuller and Perdue
(1936) who suggest that only \reasonable" investment be protected by breach remedies, Cooter
and Eisenberg (1985; p. 1467) limit expectation damages to what they are under ecient in-
vestment (cf. Craswell, 1989; Leitzel, 1989; Spier and Whinston, 1995). That way, if damages
are based on the hypothetical ecient level and therefore independent of actual investment, the
full insurance argument ceases to apply and the incentive to overinvest is eliminated.
Second, even if ecient expectation damages are the default remedy for seller's breach of
contract, the buyer's investment incentives may be diluted due to an ex-ante hold-up problem
as result of buyer's imperfect bargaining power in contract renegotiations. In general, investing
parties will eciently invest if they can recoup the full returns of their investment expenditures.
If their share of the renegotiation surplus, however, is less than one, their incentives are distorted
and underinvestment will be the result. Putting it in this paper's notation and trade technology:
Given  q such that there exists a positive renegotiation surplus g (r;) > 0, if the probability 
of the buyer's oer is less than unity then r < .
This underinvestment result will hold for all  < 1, however, only if termination of the
relationship is not an option and there is trade in the second period with certainty both on and
o the equilibrium path, that means if breakup is noncredible for  = 0. To see this, suppose
 is strictly positive and, given that he underinvests for some  < 1, the buyer's exit threat
credible. The \value" of this threat has two components: First, the eect on the buyer's rst
period payos through the impact of the exit threat on quality level 1 = ~ 1 (;r), amounting
to  b(r; ~ 1 (;r))    b(r;   ()); second, the buyer's continuation value of option `E' relative to
`C', equal to  
 ~ b

by Corollary 1. The full threat value is equal to
Z  
~ 




h(r; ()) +   (r;)

f ()d (15)
18and increasing in r for positive , as can be seen from its rst derivative with respect to r,
Z  
~ 
@ [v (r; q)   v (r; ())]
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The buyer's bargaining leverage induced by  thus yields additional returns on investment r.
That way, the breakup rule enhances the buyer's (exogenous) bargaining power , and if this
rent-seeking eect is strong and his \break-up" rents high enough, it may fully restore his
investment incentives when he would otherwise underinvest for  < 1. Lemma 5 formalizes
these results. It states that for a positive breakup rule ^ (;  q) the buyer eciently invests, yet
that for all  < ^ (;  q) investment r falls short of the ecient level . Moreoever, it also shows
that the buyer will never overinvest even if his bargaining leverage exceeds the level of eciency
restoration. This implication is a direct consequence of the application of ecient expectation
damages and negative compensation bias (Lemma 1) for r > . By overinvesting, the buyer
forfeits the credibility of his exit threat which deprives him of the positive investment returns.
Lemma 5 (Investment). Buyer's specic investment r is a function of the breakup rule 
that complements his bargaining power . For a repeat transaction contract Z there exists a
^ (;  q) > 0 such that the buyer eciently invests r =  for   ^ (;  q) and underinvests for
all  if  < ^ (;  q).
The Corollary to Lemma 5 gives comparative statics results of the investment restoring
^ (;  q) and comments on its feasibility. As the buyer's incentive dilution, i.e. the degree of
underinvestment, increases with lower  and  q, a stronger rent-seeking eect is required to
restore ecient investment incentives. For low values of  and  q an infeasible breakup rule
^ (;  q) outside the unit interval may be the result.
Corollary 3. (1) ^  (;  q) < 0; (2) ^  q (;  q) < 0; (3) ^ (;  q) is not within the unit interval for
suciently small values of  and  q.
Given  and  q, for the semi-renegotiated contract under contract rigidity the subgame per-
fect equilibrium (SPE) strategies are functions of the breakup rule  and denoted by ~ () =
(();) for the buyer and ~  (;) = (1 (;);2 (;)) for the seller. They are characterized
by the results of Lemmata 4 and 5, and for ~ 1 ()  ~ 1 (;()) are given as
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if ^ (;  q)  .
(17)
In the next section, I investigate the properties of this SPE with respect to the breakup
rule. So far  has been viewed as an exogenous model parameter. For the remainder of the
19paper I will treat it as additional decision variable and analyze its strategic dimension. On
the one hand, one may look at it from a public solution perspective. That means a lawmaker
species a detailed default rule that simply needs to be enforced by a court of law, or it remains
vague in its ruling which allows for a litigator's discretionary policy. On the other hand, the
decision over  may be seen as private solution: Parties do not rely on the lawmaker or third
party litigators to fully assess their trade relationship but specify the exact breakup rule in their
contract and rely on its enforcement only. In any case, since the given model does not exhibit
any external eects on other agents,11 if the public solution is founded on welfare maximization
principles and does not dier in terms of transaction costs, then it will simply replicate the
private contractual solution. I will therefore abstract from the question of who species the
breakup rule and simply report results on existence or nonexistence of a  that implements
the rst-best outcome.
5 Optimal breakup rules
The class of repeat transaction contracts is dened as the set of simple contracts that specify
a price and quality for the goods to be delivered. Since the quality level is by assumption
restricted such that  q < qmax and thus some  for which  () >  q, a rst-best quality level
for good i, given r =  and the no-windfall-gains assumption in equation (5), will only be
delivered for all  if the contract is renegotiated. Recall that the choice set QR for  qR is
unrestricted. This rst-best quality up to full conformity was dened as constrained rst-best
  ()  minf ();  qg. The fact, that the rst period quality level cannot be rst-best for all
 in a semi-renegotiated contract framework implies that a rst-best outcome as introduced
in Denition 1 is not an appropriate benchmark. Hence, for the case of semi-renegotiation, I
consider a rst-best equilibrium outcome with the rst period quality level an ecient  ()
up to full conformity  q. Note that if an outcome is rst-best it is also constrained rst-best,
but not vice versa.





  (); ()
	
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5.1 Second-best under contract rigidity
The following Proposition presents the eciency properties of the SPE under contract rigidity
with the sequence of actions depicted in Figure 1. From equation (17) it has already become
clear that the equilibrium strategies are not constrained rst-best. This is because the seller
will only deliver a rst-best second quality if the buyer invests eciently for ^ (;  q). The
resulting bargaining leverage, however, will induce the seller to ineciently overshoot in the
rst period (ex-post hold-up). A constrained rst-best quality in t = 1 will only be delivered
for  = 0; in that case, if g (;) > 0 for some , the buyer, being deprived of his breakup
11See Ganglmair (2007) for a related analysis accounting for externalities.
20rents, will underinvest for all  (ex-ante hold-up).12 Then, the second period quality falls short
of the ecient level, o (r;) <  () for all . A second-best breakup rule  thus balances
the eects of buyer's rent-seeking and trades o the ineciencies from underinvestment (and
second period quality) and excessive rst period quality.
Proposition 2 (Contract rigidity). Let the contract be semi-renegotiated. A breakup rule 
such that the equilibrium outcome is constrained rst-best does not exist. A second-best equilib-
rium outcome is implemented by a strictly positive breakup rule .
As long as  q > 0 and  > 0, the seller will always overshoot for any r   and  > 0. Under
the assumption of contract rigidity, a (constrained) rst-best can therefore only be implemented
if  = 0 and  q and  such that ^ (;  q) = 0. This is accomplished if there are no types  such
that the traded quality level is insucient and the buyer has full bargaining power, hence in
case of unrestricted contract choice such that  q = qmax and  = 1. The rst condition implies
that the returns on investment are not suboptimal, the second ensures that the buyer indeed
receives the full returns and thus exhibits undiluted investment incentives at stage 0. Corollary 4
summarizes this polar case; note that for such a Cadillac contract (Edlin, 1996) the quality level
  () =  () is unconstrained for all  and the benchmark a rst-best f~ ;~  ()g.
Corollary 4 (Cadillac contract). Suppose that  q = qmax, then  = 0 implements the benchmark
outcome if and only if  = 1.
Given any restricted  q 2 Q, the assumption of contract rigidity renders the rst-best bench-
mark non-implementable since the buyer underinvests even for full bargaining power  = 1,
and additional bargaining leverage through  > 0 is required to restore his ecient incentives.
If contract choice is unrestricted and  q = qmax, then only an oer probability of  = 1 yields
undiluted investment incentive, and rent-seeking through  > 0 = ^ (1;qmax) is not favorable as
it distorts the seller's quality decisions. Hence, for the setup with contract rigidity such that Z
is only semi-renegotiated the hold-up problem prevails for buyer's imperfect bargaining power.
Its negative eciency eects, however, can be mitigated by specifying an appropriate breakup
rule.
5.2 First-best under frictionless renegotiation
For the nal part of the paper, I assume renegotiation of Z to be without any frictions. In
such a setting, the equilibrium results for the semi-renegotiated contract serve as disagreement
point payos for stage-1-renegotiations. The argument for this is straightforward: If parties
fail to agree in stage 1, they will trade good 1 under the terms of contract Z and re-enter
renegotiations before the delivery of good 2 (cf. Figure 2). At this point they will engage in
12Since  q < q
max in order for g (
;) > 0 and since the rst period not renegotiated, the fact that  1 =  q <

 () and vr (r;  q) < vr (r;
 ()) for some , dilutes the buyer's investment incentives even if he receives the
entire stage-2-renegotiation surplus. See also the proof of Lemma 5 in the Appendix and Corollary 4.
21stage-2-renegotiations with continuation values as given in Lemma 3. When engaging in stage-
1-renegotiations, the disagreement point payos are equal to what the parties will receive if
trade is under the terms of Z in t = 1 and of ZR in t = 2. Given , r and , by equation (17)
these payos amount to
e S (r; ~ 1 (;r);) = w(; ~ 1 (;r);)   b(;  q) + ~ s(r; ~ 1 (;r);) (18)
for the seller and
e B (r; ~ 1 (;r);) =  b(r; ~ 1 (;r)) +~ b(r; ~ 1 (;r);) (19)
for the buyer. Because state (r;) is observable to both parties and constant over time, from
equation (9) it is known that the new time-invariant quality level for delivery of good 1 and
good 2 is equal to  qR (r;) and maximizes the gains of trade W (r;~ q;). In equilibrium,
()   holds, thus by equation (10) the seller delivers a quality level R =  qR (r;) in
both periods. Moreover, R   qR (r;) for all , hence the seller is not inclined to over-
shoot and 1 = 2 =  qR (r;) independent of . The equilibrium quality levels are therefore
~ o (r;) = (o (r;);o (r;)). As the buyer's investment is a function of breakup rule  and
denoted by r = (), the seller's equilibrium strategy vector can be rewritten as ~ o (();).
Analogously to Lemma 5, an appropriate  = ^ (;  q), if it exists given  and  q, restores the
buyer's investment incentives. Hence, if the public or private choice of the breakup rule is
 = ^ (;  q), then r = (^ (;  q)) =  and ~ o ((^ (;  q));) = ~ o (;) = ~  ().
Proposition 3 (Full-renegotiation). If the repeat transaction contract Z is fully renegotiated,
then there exists a positive  = ^ (;  q) =  such that the rst-best outcome is implemented.
Recall from Lemma 3 that the buyer forfeits his exit threat if he overinvests. That means for
any investment level r >  the threat value in equation (15) is equal to zero, and overinvestment
is therefore strictly dominated by r = . This implies that, if  is such that it ensures ecient
investment, any breakup rule higher than this investment restoring level does not aect the
buyer's incentives. His increased bargaining leverage yields a higher threat value, but, despite
the positive eect on the marginal investment returns in equation (16), still induces ecient
investment incentives. Hence, since the seller's equilibrium strategy vector  () is independent
of , the SPE is rst-best for all  > ^ (;  q). As a result, the parties' joint expected surplus is
constant for suciently high levels of . The buyer's increased ex-post bargaining leverage will
be fully priced in ex-ante; it will, however, result in ex-post redistribution.
Corollary 5 (Redistribution). Any breakup rule  >  implements a rst-best outcome and
redistributes the realized gains of trade from the seller to the buyer.
Given Proposition 3 and Corollary 5, the SPE for a repeat transaction contract with fric-
22tionless renegotiation can be rewritten as






















if ^ (;  q)  .
(20)
The seller overshoots only o the equilibrium path. By the assumption of perfect state observ-
ability, the parties are able to agree on equilibrium quality levels on the Pareto-frontier, the
optimization problem with respect to  is therefore reduced to inducing ecient equilibrium
investment. Allowing the buyer to engage in rent-seeking, by granting the breakup option with
positive probability, has a positive social value. The buyer's opportunism is in fact required to
achieve a rst-best outcome. Suppose the buyer were able to fully commit not to cancel the
contract, i.e. exercise his exit threat, by  = 0 or an upfront payment that ensures that he will
never do so (cf. Edlin, 1996), then his investment incentives will be diluted (unless  q = qmax and
 = 1). Hence, having the ropes untied by his seamen might not be a bad strategy for Ulysses
after all.
In Corollary 3, I brie
y commented on the existence of an investment restoring ^ (;  q).
While in case of contract rigidity a ^ (;  q) > 1 may still allow for a second-best breakup rule
within the bounds of the unit interval,  < 1, a rst-best rule  exists if and only if ^ (;  q)
exists. Corollary 6 complements the existence arguments.




= 1. Then for any contract Z
with  q 2

q ();qmax
and Assumption 2 satised, there exists an appropriate breakup rule such
that buyer's rent-seeking restores the rst-best outcome f~ ;~  ()g.
5.3 Legal implications
As mentioned in the introductory section, U.S. contract law explicitly accounts for repeat trans-
action contracts (\installment contract") and stipulates a breakup rule that is conditional on
the seller's performance rather than the likelihood of future nonconformities.13 Section x2-612
of the Uniform Commercial Code (American Law Institute, 2000; White and Summers, 2000)
denes such an installment contract as one over \the delivery of goods in separate lots to be
separately accepted." It rules that if a nonconformity in one of the installments \substantially
impairs" the value of the whole contract, then there is total breach of contract. In that case the
buyer can anticipatorily reject any future installments and is entitled to full compensation for
these nondelivered goods. A strict compliance rule, i.e. a lax breakup rule, thuse expands the
buyer's right to terminate, that means increases the probability of a credible exit option `E.'
13International commercial law gives rules \consistent" (Speidel, 1992; p. 140) with the ones observed in the
United States (see also Bugge, 1999; Katz, 2005), although with dierent terminology: The Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) requires \fundamental breach" in order for the buyer to
\avoid" (cancel, exit) the contract (Hull, 2005; p. 150).
23Comment 6 of that Section oers guidelines as to the nature of nonconformities that may be
considered when determining such substantial impairment. It states that \whether the noncon-
formity in any given installment justies cancellation as to the future depends not on whether
such nonconformity indicates an intent or likelihood that the future deliveries will also be defec-
tive, but whether the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the whole contract." The
breakup rule in Denition 3 accounts for this conditionality on seller's actual performance and
has implications on the bargaining routines in stage-1 and stage-2-renegotiations. The game
to be played (via the buyer's outside options) in the latter setup is by parties' choice. In the
former scenario the buyer can anticipate the seller's (o-equilibrium) delivery of the rst quality
level, yet cannot threaten a termination of the contract upon observation of a suciently low
type  < ~ . Notice that if the breakup rule were conditional on the seller's type, we would
obtain a constrained rst-best outcome even under contract rigidity (cf. Proposition 2). To
see this, suppose  is veriable, yet writing a fully contingent contract is prohibitively costly,
hence Z incomplete and simple. While in stage-2-renegotiations the buyer exercises his exit
threat if  is suciently low, the seller will not benet from overshooting as the breakup rule is
now conditional on a state variable. Ecient expectation damages imply that she will deliver
a constrained rst-best quality vector for all  while the breakup rule can be adjusted such
that the buyer's investment incentives are undiluted. The model's results suggest that under
certain conditions (in particular veriability of state variable ) the guidelines in Comment 6
of Section x2-612 of the Uniform Commercial Code may indeed distract trade and facilitate
suboptimal outcomes.
The legal literature on contract termination restrictions has argued in favor of a deviation
from the strict compliance rules in order to protect investment incentives.14 These implications,
however, only hold true if the investing party is the victim of termination (cf. Proposition 1),
i.e. the seller. If the investor is indeed the buyer, a restriction of the exit option aligns the seller's
performance incentives, yet it may render the buyer's investment incentives diluted. Allowing
for buyer's opportunistic rent-seeking and thus increasing his returns on investment can restore
a second or even rst-best outcome. Moreover, if the buyer's bargaining power is suciently
low, a strict compliance rule such that  = 0 may indeed be necessary to induce ecient
investment. As provocative as it may sound, insisting on a substantial rather than a strict
compliance standard of performance, as promoted for instance by Llewellyn (1937; pp. 375),
may in the end lead to insucient investment.
6 Conclusions
I consider a repeat transaction model with buyer's specic investment and show that if termi-
nation of trade is in the buyer's choice set, then simple renegotiable contracts can implement
a rst-best outcome if termination is restricted by an appropriate linear breakup rule (public
14See, e.g., Goldberg and Erickson (1987) for long-term contracts or Goetz and Scott (1981), Baird, Gertner,
and Picker (1994; p. 232), or Schwartz and Scott (2003) for mandatory acceptance of substantial performance.
24solution, legal default rule; or private solution, contract clause). This result will hold as long
as contract renegotiation is frictionless and the entire contract can be adapted to the realized
state. Then, an optimal breakup rule, that is conditional on the seller's performance, gives the
buyer the right to exit the contract with strictly positive probability. In ex-post renegotiations,
the buyer will exploit this threat and expropriate future rents from the seller. These expected
\breakup rents" increase his returns on investment. The bargaining leverage that arises from
the breakup rule therefore complements his ex-post bargaining power and restores his ex-ante
investment incentives when he would otherwise underinvest. A breakup rule may thus \correct"
for deviations from full bargaining power and mitigate the resulting hold-up problem.
When the contract is not fully 
exible, i.e. the contract can be renegotiated only after the rst
commodity has been delivered, then the buyer's exploitation of the exit threat holds up the seller
who in equilibrium will overshoot in order not to grant the buyer the right to terminate. For such
a setting with contract rigidity, a rst-best outcome cannot be implemented by a simple contract
and a conditional breakup rule. This is because the seller will eciently perform only for a full
restriction of buyer's termination, which in return deprives the buyer of his \breakup rents"
and dilutes his investment incentives. A second-best outcome is implemented by a breakup rule
that allows both for seller's excessive performance and buyer's ineciently low investment.
The contract literature has brought forward an array of complex contractual solutions that
implement a rst-best outcome. In reality, however, contracts are observed to be much simpler
than is theoretically predicted (see, e.g., Macaulay, 1963; Hart and Holmstr om, 1987). One
possible reason, as argued by Huberman and Kahn (1988) among others is that in order to save
on contracting costs, agents substitute for complex contracts and enter simple agreements that
are renegotiated after uncertainties are resolved. Similarly, parties may rely on (ecient) legal
default rules and standards to ll gaps in their contracts and thus shift the burden of transactions
costs to the public (see, e.g., Ayres and Gertner, 1989; Schwartz, 1992). The insights from the
semi-renegotiated contract (cf. also Watson, 2007) suggest that entering simple, renegotiable
contracts is only reliable if renegotiation is without frictions.
In both presented renegotiation scenarios, a positive breakup rule allows for buyer's op-
portunistic rent-seeking that mitigates the hold-up problem from less-than-perfect bargaining
power. The buyer's opportunism thus generates social value; put dierently, without his oppor-
tunistic behavior a rst-best outcome is not reached. This result has interesting implications
for the literature on compliance rules. The conventional wisdom is that restricting premature
contract termination protects specic investment in long-term contractual relationships. The
right to terminate is thus not granted for trivial defects of delivery (strict compliance) but if
a nonconformity is substantial. This, however, will not hold true if the investing party is not
the victim of termination. If one party decides both on the level of specic investment and the
continuation or termination of trade, then a strict compliance standard may indeed be optimal
as it restores rather than distorts investment incentives.
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28Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (Compensation bias)
Proof. The buyer's true expectation interest given r is equal to v (r;  q)    p. By equation (5) he is
compensated as if he had eciently invested. His eective payos, given damages in (5) amount to
 b(r;qi) = v (r;qi)   p+v (;  q) v (;qi). Rearranging this yields  b(r;qi) = v (;  q)   p h(r;qi). The
dierence between the compensated payos and the true expectation interest is given as
 b(r;qi)   (v (r;  q)    p) = v (;  q)    p   h(r;qi)   v (r;  q) +  p
= v (;  q)   v (r;  q)   h(r;qi)
= h(r;  q)   h(r;qi)
By denition of h(), this expression is equal to zero for r = . By the assumption of positive cross-
derivatives vqir > 0 it is straightforward that the compensation bias is positive for underinvestment
r <  and negative if r > , given qi <  q. For a fully or supraconforming qi   q the buyer is not
compensated. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let there be three cases: 1. r < , 2. r = , and 3. r > .
1. For r < : It is to be shown that  (r;) = w(r;o (r;);)  w(r;2;) =   (r;) for 2 =
minf ();  qg. As o (r;) 2 argmaxq2 w(r;q2;) the inequality holds strict for all  such that
o (r;) 6=  q and is in equality if, given r, the optimal quality is just conforming, o (r;) =  q.
2. For r = : Similar to the argument in 1., the inequality is strict if  such that  () 6=  q.
3. For r > : Since R =  (),  (r;) = w(r; ();)  w(r;2;) =   (r;) holds by the
argument of constrained maximization (no-windfall-gains assumption) under Z. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3 (Continuation values)
Proof. The parties' outside option payos are as follows:
buyer plays continue `C' :
  b(r;2);   (;)   b(;  q)

(A1)
buyer plays exit `E' :
(   b(;  q);  b(;  q)







if q1   q.
(A2)
The seller will accept the buyer's renegotiation oer xS if it grants her payos that are at least as
high as under as her respective outside option value. Analogously, the buyer will accept the seller's oer
xB if he is at least as well o as under the respective outside option.
For the subgame starting after the rejection of an oer xS or xB, the buyer's play  = E is strictly
dominated if r > . This implies that at this stage of the game the buyer will not exercise his break-up
option and an exit threat is not credible. The relevant outside option is therefore `C.' To see this, not
that by Lemma 1 it holds that  b(;  q) <  b(r;2) =  b(;  q) h(r;q2). If r   and  b(;  q)   b(r;q2),
Assumption 2 ensures that the buyer's exit threat is credible (i.e. the payos from exit not dominated
in the subgame starting after rejection) if and only if q1 <  q. Suppose the buyer plays `E' if q1   q;
then it needs to hold that   se
2 >  b(r;2) =  b(;  q)   h(r;2). Rearranging this expression yields
E(  (;)) < h(r;2) with E an expectation operator over cdf F (). By monotinicity of v () in r and
q2 it holds that h(r;2) is maximized for r = 0 and  such that 2 =  q. Since by Assumption 1 the
inequality is violated, it does not hold for all possible pairs of r and q2, establishing the non-credibility
of `E' if q1   q.
Let r > . With probability , the buyer makes an oer xS yielding his payos (if accepted) of
 (r;)   xS, where  (r;) is dened in Lemma 2. Similarly, with probability 1    the seller's oer xB
29yields her own payos  (r;)   xB. The payo vectors are






 (r;)     (;) + b(;  q)








 (r;)   b(r;2)

:




  r > 
=  (;(r)   xS) + (1   )xB
= 

 (r;)     (;) + b(;  q)

+ (1   ) b(r;2)
=  b(r;2) +  [ (r;)     (;) + h(r;2)]
=  b(r;2) +  [ (r;)     (r;)]
=  b(r;2) + g (r;) (A3)





 r > 
= xS + (1   )( (r;)   xB)
= 
 
  (;)   b(;  q)

+ (1   )
 
 (r;)   b(r;2)

=   (;)   b(;  q) + (1   )[ (r;)     (;) + h(r;2)]
=   (;)   b(;  q) + (1   )g (r;) (A4)
for the seller. By the above credibility argument it holds true that the renegotiation game yields
the continuation values in (A3) and (A4) also for r   and q1   q, i.e. ~ b
 
r;q1;














  r  ;q1   q

.
For r   and q1 <  q, continuation values ~ b and ~ s are determined in the same way. The renegoti-
ation payos for buyer's and seller's take-it-or-leave-it oer are






 (r;) + b(;  q)




 (r;)   xB

=
  b(;  q)
 (r;)   b(;  q)

:





 r  ;q1 <  q

=  b(;  q) +  (r;) (A5)





 r  ;q1 <  q

=   b(;  q) + (1   ) (r;) (A6)
for the seller. It is straightforward to see that the renegotiation game proposed in Section 3 implements
an asymmetric Nash-bargaining solution with the outside option payos in equations (A1) and (A2) as
disagreement point payos and  the buyer's bargaining share of the renegotiation surplus g (r;) (and
 (r;) in case of a credible exit threat for q1 <  q). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1











 q1 <  q

 b(r;2) + g (r;)   b(;  q) +  (r;)
 h(r;2) + g (r;)   (r;)
   (r;)  h(r;2) (A7)
30Note that h(r;2) = 0 if r =  or 2 = 0. Since  = E is not an equilibrium strategy for the
buyer, 2 = 0 if and only if  = 0. In that case, the expression in equation (A7) is reduced
to  0 = 0. If r = , then the inequality is strict only if the LHS of (A7) is negative, which
is true for  > 0 and  > 0. If r <  and  > 0, then the RHS is strictly positive, the
inequality in (A7) is strict for all .
(b) For r > : Straightforward by the payos in Lemma 3.











 q1 <  q

  (;)   b(;  q) + (1   )g (r;)    b(;  q) + (1   ) (r;)
 pi(;)  (1   )   (r;)
w(;2;)  (1   )w(r;2;): (A8)
Recall from equation (7) that 2 2 argmaxq2 q w(;q2;), and for r <  it holds true for
all  that
w(r;2;) = v (r;2)   c(2;) < v (;2)   c(2;) = w(;2;):





 r = 
= w(;2;), then the inequality in (A8) is strict if and only if  > 0.
(b) For r > : Straightforward by the payos in Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4 (Quality)




> 0 the seller's production incentives are
distorted; I then show that for some parameter restrictions this is true with strictly positive probability.
1. The seller's decision problem in t = 1 is to maximize her payos e S (r;q1;) over q1, given as
1 2 argmax
q1 q
e S (r;q1;) = w(;q1;)   b(;  q) + ~ s(r;q1;):
If the incremental eect of q1 on ~ s(r;q1;) is equal to zero, then the seller's production will be




> 0, however, the
seller will account for the intertemporal eect of q1 on her second period payos.
2. To determine the range of seller types that will overshoot and deliver quality 1 =  q >  (),




> 0 (Corollary 1). By Lemma 3, the seller's rst period optimization
problem can then be characterized as
~ 1 (;r) 2 argmax
q1 q
w(;q1;)   b(;  q) + 1(q1 q) [w(;2;)   (1   )w(r;2;)]
with 1(q1 q) equal to unity if q1   q, zero otherwise. 1(q1 q) [w(;2;)   (1   )w(r;2;)]
gives the incremental eect of a delivery  q on e S (r;q1;). The seller's payos thus exhibit a
discontinuity at this break-up threshold. Moreover, let   such that    
=  q, then the








; q;  
  (1   )w
 
r; q;  
> 0 (A9)
for all r <  or  > 0. This expression gives the seller's value of overshooting. For  >   she
will deliver a quality 1 =   (). For lower types,  <  , however, she will not deliver an optimal
quality q1 =  () as long as this (second period) value of  q >  () more than osets the
additional costs of excessive delivery (rst period payo losses), i.e. as long as e S (r; ();) <
31e S (r; q;) or, for 2 =  () since  <  ,
w(; q;) > (1   )w(r; ();)




; q; ~ 



















is non-negative, hence 0 < ~  since w(; q;0) < 0 for  > 0 and  q > 0.
Let e  =
h
~ ;  

, then by 0 < ~  <   it holds true that e  * ; and e   .
Seller types larger equal ~  and lower than   will by the continuity of F () with positive probability
deliver an excessive quality level q1 =  q >  (). The quality 1 as result of the seller's rst
period optimization problem is given as




 () if  < ~  or  2
 ;  

 q if  2
h
~ ;  

 q if    .
Note that ~ 1 (;r) =   () if  = 0. Q.E.D.







 the measure of overshooting types and as such the probability of ineciently quality
delivery. This probability is 1. increasing in  and 2. decreasing in r.
1. Let by denition of ~  in equation (A10), H  w











= 0. By the




where H and H~  denote rst




; q; ~ 

@q1




; q; ~ 

@~ 









@~  | {z }
> 0; = 0 for r = 




















< 0; = 0 for r = 
 or  = 1
> 0:
The second term for H~  is negative by concavity of w in qi and the fact that for r <  a quality
level of  () is excessive. Further note that for a xed qi the gains of trade increase with the buyer
productivity type. Thus, due to vqir > 0, the dierence in the rst term is positive, rendering
H~  > 0. Hence, @~ =@ > 0 if r and  such that q1~ s(r;q1) > 0.








> 0 it needs to hold
that @~ =@ < @ =@. The following equality holds by the denition of   and equation (A10):
w
 







; q; ~ 










Note that ~  is monotonically decreasing in . I only establish the result for  = 1, the general
results follows straight from these arguments. The expression is rewritten as
w
 







; q; ~ 

:




is decreasing in  , which leads to a contradiction.











> 0. From (a) we know that H~  > 0, moreover











which is straightforward by vr > 0. As ~  <  , ~ r > 0 and  
r =, the probability of overshooting
is decreasing in r. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5 (Investment)
Proof. The buyer maximizes his expected payos b B (r) = E e B (r;)   z (r) over investment r, where
e B (r;) =  b(r; ~ 1 (;r)) +~ b(r; ~ 1 (r);) and
 2 argmax
r2R
b B (r) =
Z

e B (r;)f ()d   z (r):
For r   the expected rst and second period payos as function of the seller's equilibrium strategy
1 (r) are given as
E b
 
r; ~ 1 (;r)










































r; ~ 1 (;r);

































h(r;  q) + w(r;  q;)

f ()d + b(;  q); (A12)
for r >  they are equal to
E b
 
r; ~ 1 (;r)
  r > 
=  b(;  q)  
Z  
0
h(r; ())f ()d  
Z 1
 
h(r;  q)f ()d (A13)
33and since R =  ()
E~ b
 
r; ~ 1 (;r);




w(r; ();)f ()d  
Z  
0




[h(r;  q) + w(r;  q;)]f ()d + b(;  q): (A14)
To establish the results of Lemma 5, I rst show that there is no overinvestment such that r > 
and then proof the claims made.
1. An investment level r >  is a strictly dominated strategy for the buyer, since (a) his expected
payos b B (r) exhibit a negative discontinuity at r =  and (b) marginal payos for r >  are
negative. The buyer's choice of r can thus be restricted to r 2 [0;].
















w(; ();)f ()d > 0 (A15)
for  > 0 and  > 0.



























! = 0 (A16)










By the assumptions for v () and z (), the sucient condition is satised and a  > 0 exists.
Note that in equilibrium  = C. Since the repeat interaction contract is by assumption
(Denition 3) such that  q < qmax, i.e. there exist some  such that  () >  q, by the
value-enhancing assumption of specic investment, vq1r > 0, it holds that
Z 1
 








This implies that even for  = 1 the buyer will never overinvest. The FOC in equation (A16)





















342. For r  , the rst order condition
@ b B(r)
@r



























































@v (r;  q)
@r
+ 








@r . Suppose that  = 1,
i.e. the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer in the renegotiation game with probability 1 and thus
receives the entire renegotiation surplus g (r;) for   ~  and the entire second period trade surplus
of  (r;) for  < ~ . He thus receives the full returns for each unit of investment r. Moreover, let
 = 0, then ~  =   =
@~ (r)














@v (r;  q)
@r
+








By  qR (;) =  () for all  (equations (9) and (10)) and  q < qmax, it holds that
Z 1
 








and the LHS in equation (A18) smaller than necessary by FOC (4) for r = . By concavity of
z (r), the buyer will invest r <  for  = 1 and a break-up rule  = 0. This underinvestment
eect will be stronger for lower  q.
To show that  > 0 improves the eciency properties of r, note that for  = 1 and  > 0 the
following holds true: ~  > 0,   > 0, and
@~ (r)
@r . Both   and  qR (r;) are unaected by . The eect
of  on the buyer's investment incentives is characterized by the dierence between the RHS in


























f ()d > 0: (A19)
It is straightforward to check that the rst term on the LHS is positive. The second term, too, is
positive since  () <  q for all  <  . This is a direct consequence of the value-enhancing eect
of r. Recall, h(r;q1) = v (;q1)   v (r;q1). By equation (A11), for r <  the expected buyer's
rst period payos are increasing in the actual quality level q1. This is because for a positive  the
seller overshoots, implying that, in expectations, the seller delivers higher quality|ineciently




  = 0

=   (). Hence, the buyer break-up threat drives the
delivered quality and increases the buyer's marginal return on investment. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. 1. ^  (;  q) < 0: As is straightforward from equation (A17) for  = 0 and  < 1, the buyer's
underinvestment incentives are stronger the lower his (Nash-)bargaining power . Moreover, (A19)
is less pronounced for  < 1, the eect of  > 0 on investment r thus weaker. Hence, ^ (;  q)
decreases in .
2. ^  q (;  q) < 0: As by equation (A18) a lower  q aggravates the underinvestment eect for  = 0
for a given , it increases the eciency restoring break-up rule parameter ^ (;  q) that ensures
equation (A19) be equal to zero.
3. The existence of a ^ (;  q) within the unit interval is not granted. As ^ (;  q) grows larger for small
values of  and  q, there may not exist a pair (;  q) such that ^ (;  q)  1. For instance, for  = 0
35the value of the buyer's exit threat evaluated at r =  is equal to zero and close to zero in the
neighborhood of  (cf. equation (16)). In that case, the lower  q, the less likely a breakup rule
 = 1 be able to restore the buyer's investment incentives. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Semi-renegotiation) Given the SPE strategies in equation (17), the




W (~ ();~  (;);)f ()d   z (());
where
W (~ ();~  (;);) = w(();1 ();) + w(();o ((););): (A20)
1. The nonexistence of a rst-best outcome is straightforward from equation (17). By Lemma 5, the
buyer's investment is ecient only if  = ^ (;  q) > 0. By Lemma 4 and the buyer's equilibrium
investment r  , the seller will overshoot with positive probability if  > 0. Ecient quality
delivery (up to  q in period t = 1) is achieved with  = 0. A rst-best outcome as in Denition 1
cannot be implemented under the given institutional framework.
2. A second-best break-up rule  trades o the ineciencies from overshooting and underinvestment
and is bounded by 0 and ^ . This rule is dened as
 2 arg max
2[0;1]
b (): (A21)
Recall that 2 = o () 2 argmaxq2 w(();q2;). The rst order condition for this optimization
























































Substituting for the FOC of the buyer's optimization problem with respect to r in equation (A17),

























































f ()d > 0:
The second-best rule therefore allows for some break-up to induce investment closer to the ecient
level. It thus trades o eciencey in investment and rst period quality.
Proof of Corollary 4 (Cadillac contract)














and holds for r =  if  = 1. If  < 1, then by Denition 1 the LHS is smaller than the RHS when
evaluated at r = . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Full-renegotiation)
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemmata 4 and 5. It is easy to see that the underlying bargaining
structure yields an asymmetric Nash-bargaining solution (cf. Lemma 3). The parties will agree on
a price  pR such that both receive their disagreement point payos plus a share  of the rst-stage
renegotiation surplus G(r;). Since, given r the equilibrium quality levels are optimal and ~ o (r;) =
(o (r;);o (r;)), the negotiation surplus is equal to the dierence between the optimal trade surplus
and the trade surplus from the semi-renegotiated contract as given in equation (A20),
G(r;) = W (r;~ o (r;);)   f W (~ ();~  (;r););
with ~  (;r) = (~ 1 (;r);o (r;)). Since the second period payos are  (r;) in both scenarios, the
renegotiation surplus can be rewritten as
G(r;) = w(r;o (r;);)   w(r; ~ 1 (;r);):
The seller will deliver optimal quality levels given r, and the buyer's investment decision (as in
Lemma 5) is a function of ,  q, and . He maximizes his expected payos




e B (r; ~ 1 (;r);) + G(r;)
i
f ()d   z (r):
Suppose  = 1 and  = 0. By Lemma 4 it follows that ~ 1 (;r) =   (), and
 2 argmax
r






   = C

f ()d    Se
with  Se the seller's expected payos under contract Z and o-equilibrium quality levels ~ 1 (;r) and
2 =   (). Since  Se is independent of r, by the denition of the rst-best investment level in equation (4)
the buyer will eciently invest,  = . Hence, for  = 1 and complete rent extraction by the buyer,
the rst-best outcome is implemented for  = 0. For  < 1 and less-than-complete rent extraction, the
implications are as in Lemma 5. A positive break-up parameter  complements the buyer's bargaining
power  < 1. For suciently high  there exists a  = ^  =  such that  =  Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 5 (Redistribution)
Proof. By Lemma 5 it holds that overinvestment is a strictly dominated strategy, hence    for all
. Since the seller will always deliver quality level o (r;) in the full-renegotiation scenario, any   
implements rst-best quality and investment levels. By ~  > 0, the buyer's threat value in equation (A15)
and hence his overall expected payos b B
 
()
    
= b B () are increasing in  while the realized




   
are unaected. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 6 (Existence)
Proof. The proof follows straight from Corollary 3 and Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
37